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1629-1692. By .David Thomas Konig. Chapel Hill: The University 
of North Carolina Press. 1979. Pp. xxi, 215. $21. 
DISPUTE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN PLYMOUTH COUNTY, MAS-
SACHUSETTS, 1725-1825. By William E. Nelson. Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press. 1981. Pp. xi, 212. $21. 
FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS: CREATORS 
OF VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE, 1680-1810. By A. G. Roeber. Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 1981. Pp. xx, 292. 
$24. 
In a profession whose practitioners are not ordinarily distinguished by a 
capacity for silence, historians have kept one secret fairly well. The legal 
variety of Clio's calling is being resurrected. Ever since the late 1960's his-
torians in increasing numbers have discovered American law as an object 
worthy of close scrutiny.1 Nowhere is the resurrection more evident than in 
the work now under way on the colonial origins of our law. Indeed, the 
outpouring of books, articles, dissertations, theses, and papers, of which the 
three books under review here are but more recent examples, threatens to 
turn legal history into the new wave in early-American studies. That is an 
encouraging sign. It holds the promise that, finally, the investigation of le-
gal things may someday be joined to the larger field of colonial history, 
where it properly belongs. Additionally, it serves notice of the need for an 
occasional evaluation of the direction and content of current research. The 
appearance of Messrs Konig's, Nelson's and Roeber's books provides one 
such opportunity. 
For legal historians, the central theme of the colonial period has been to 
• Professor of History, University of New Orleans. A.B. 1962 The College of William and 
Mary, A.M. 1964, University of Pittsburgh. Ph.D. 1968, Northern Illinois University - Ed. 
1. Fixing a date for such beginnings is always difficult to document precisely, and so when 
the so-called "second revival" of legal history started is subject to debate. A useful index is 
when the architects began to write in terms of new beginnings. By that measure, the late sixties 
and early seventies marked the start of a renewed interest in legal history. See, e.g., Flaherty, 
An Introduction to Early American Legal History, in EsSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY 
AMERICAN LAW 3 (D. Flaherty ed. 1969); 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY (D. Fla-
herty & B. Bailyn eds. 1971); Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law 
Tradition in American Legal Historiography, 10 LAW & SocY. REV. 9 (1975). 
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emphasize the transfer and transformation of common law in its American 
setting. From the 1880's to the 1960's, that accent caused them to regard 
colonial law in a particular way. First, by training and temperament, they 
were inclined to investigate what Robert W. Gordon has called the internal 
aspects of law; that is, to treat it as an independent entity, whose autono-
mous features must be understood.2 Their concern was therefore with the 
development of colonial precedents, procedures, courts, and jurisdictions, 
and in explaining these technicalities, they assumed, sometimes quite with-
out compelling proof, that certain English rules or customs dictated direct· 
American borrowings. Attorneys, law professors, or judges, they frequently 
glossed over the seventeenth century, which they regarded as populated 
with legal primitives, preferring instead to devote their energies to discover-
ing the circumstances leading to such things as the rise of the professional 
bar. Next, these scholars, because they trained or taught at the great eastern 
law schools, tended to equate the New England and the Middle Colonies 
with the center of the colonial universe. Thus their work took on a decid-
edly Yankee flavor to the point where it sometimes seemed as though noth-
ing of importance occurred south of Pennsylvania. Finally, they undertook 
the printing of the stuff of legal history - statutes, court records, and other 
such documentation. Again, with a few noteworthy exceptions, New Eng-
land sources comprised the bulk of what was rendered into print.3 
The attention given to the autonomy of early American law had a con-
sequence that was as predictable as it was harmful. By stressing technicali-
ties, legal scholars engendered the myth that only they who spoke the 
special language of law were capable of interpreting the law's history to 
others. It is quite understandable how such men, given their orientation, 
should seek to cloak their discipline with professional mysteries. Moreover, 
the nature oflaw, like that of natural sciences, does require special skills of 
its historians which others obviously do not need. But, by making the mys-
teries and skills appear so unusual, if not downright arcane, they erected a 
body of knowlege so peculiar that it seemed to say almost nothing to the 
uninitiated colonialist. And so, colonial historians tended to ignore their 
period's legal history and its sources altogether. 
While their emphasis now seems misplaced, the old legal scholars did 
make important contributions. They were the pioneers who pointed ways 
for others to follow. Many of their institutional studies are now classics that 
are fundamental to modem students' grasp of the outlines of early legal 
history. What is more to the point of this essay, however, is the effect of 
their interpretations. There is a direct link between disaffection with the 
older views and the resurgent interest in doing the colonies' legal history. 
What are the impulses that caused the dissent? In the first place, even in 
its heyday, internal legal history never lacked critics, just as there were al-
ways venturesome scholars who followed independent directions. Of them, 
none has been more influential than James Willard Hurst. A prolific au-
thor, his writings have a transcendent importance because of their singular 
2. Gordon, supra note I, at 9-11. Gordon's article also provides a general summary of the 
growth of American legal historiography down to 1975, and it is upon this summary that my 
short sketch rests. 
3. See Flaherty, supra note I, at 20-32. 
March 1983] Law in Colonial America 955 
insights. The most valuable of these for the colonial era is one that now 
seems quite obvious: there is more to the American legal system than its 
rules and institutional buttresses. Apart from the technicalities, law has a 
social function. It defines and governs the social order, but not in splendid 
isolation; instead, it is susceptible to economic, political, or social impera-
tives because these are the obligations that give it definition. Thus to study 
even the most ordinary components of the legal order through time is to 
illuminate society's values, as well as how they change with the passage of 
years.4 
David H. Flaherty also had a hand in the revival. His article, "An In-
troduction to Early American Legal History," which opens the collection, 
Essays in the History of Early American Law, was a skilled survey of the 
writings on colonial law as of 1969. He repeatedly drew attention to the 
gaps in existing knowledge while he simultaneously suggested topics or 
sources that awaited exploration. Among other things, he reminded his 
readers that much remained to be done on the seventeenth century and the 
southern colonies. The entire essay reads as a brief for fresh conceptions 
and approaches to the legal problems of the settlement, growth, and matur-
ing of colonial America. Flaherty was also among the first to recognize the 
possible application of Hurst's intuitions to colonial legal studies. Both in 
the "Introduction" and elsewhere he advanced the proposition that with 
careful employment Hurst's ideas might take colonial legal history "beyond 
the traditional framework."5 
Even as Flaherty wrote, other changes were afoot. A harbinger of 
things to come was the publication of a spate of New England town studies. 
Their relevance to reviving interest in colonial law lay in their advoc:.>cy of 
what is now called "the new social history" as a way of interpreting the 
past.6 The new social historians concern themselves mainly with the past's 
little people, and in writing history from the bottom up, they accord weight 
to every fact, irrespective of its significance. What makes such a democracy 
of data manageable is the reliance upon quantitative methodologies first 
developed by French and English historical demographers. The new learn-
ing also draws intellectual sustenance from the social sciences, principally 
cultural anthropology, economics, and psychology, as well as sociological 
theories about the family and modernization. Given the serial nature of 
court records, plus some social historians' own employment of them, it was 
inevitable that scholars with interest in law should be attracted to the new 
methodologies. After all, these methods, with their reliance upon statistical 
sampling techniques and computers, did ease the tasks of sorting through 
4. See Hurst, The Law in United States History, 104 PROC. AM. PHIL. SocY. 518, 518-20 
(1960); Hurst, Legal Elements in the United States History in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 3, 73-74 (1971); James Willard Hurst: A Bibliography, 10 LAW & SocY. REV. 325 (R. 
Eskin & R. Hayden Comps. 1976). 
5. Flaherty, supra note 1, at 38. See Flaherty, An Approach to American Legal History, 14 
AM. J. LEGAL H!sT. 222, 233-34 (1970). 
6. Five of these were published in 1970. They were subsequently reviewed at length by 
John M. Murrin in II Hist. & Theory 226 (1972). Those books were also to influence southern 
colonial history. The major statement of the new social history for the colonial South is THE 
CHESAPEAKE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: EsSAYS ON ANGLO-AMERICAN SOCIETY (T. 
Tate & D. Ammerman eds. 1979). 
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great masses of records. Then too, some of the theories undergirding social 
history seemed to form links to Hurst's ideas. Here were techniques and 
thinking that could aid the quest for a basis upon which to reassess early 
American law, and they soon began to influence how legal history is writ-
ten. This effect is clearly seen in the work of Professors Konig, Nelson, and 
Roeber. 
In Law and Society in Puritan Massachusetts, David Konig investigates 
the growth oflaw in Essex County. He is concerned not only, as he puts it, 
with "the internal development of legal doctrine and procedure, but [with 
the discovery] of the demands that social, economic, and political contin-
gencies placed on legal institutions and how those institutions changed in 
order to become important in society." Also, he examines "the position of 
the legal system in a society with a multiplicity of institutional power 
sources," as he develops the theme that "the county magistracy and legal 
system must be viewed as serving many of the functions previously identi-
fied with the town or congregation" (p. xiv). 
Konig has limited the study to the years between the founding of Mas-
sachusetts and the crown's grant of the second charter. What is striking 
about Essex in those years was the Essexmen's propensity to sue one an-
other. For example, he finds that between 1672 and 1684, county residents 
filed some 3000 actions in the courts at Ipswich and Salem, a remarkable 
number indeed, when the reader recalls the expense of filings and the dan-
gers of travelling about in a colony wracked by Indian wars. 
For Konig, the question becomes why so much litigation? Traditionally, 
Puritan historians have maintained that such contentiousness evidenced the 
decline of missionary zeal among Bay colonists. As that sense of piety 
eroded, settlers turned more aggressive and acquisitive, and they looked to 
the courts to resolve their differences, thereby making those bodies instru-
ments of restraint. Konig casts that formulation aside, preferring to replace 
it with another possibility. An increase in the amount of litigation does not 
prove Massachusetts Bay to have been a pathological society; instead, it 
indicates the movement toward social stability. 
Konig makes the point that from the start the saints always had courts. 
In those early years, when the sense of mission was keenest, the legal system 
served largely to reinforce common ideals. In time, the force of those ideals 
slackened, and with that loosening came the transformation of the legal 
order. It became the pattern after which a coherent society might be fash-
ioned. At that point, it was the chief conservator of order as well. Lawsuits 
were the agency of change, and rather than being a signal of decay or a way 
to exact personal revenge, litigation supplied the Puritans with the means to 
resolve ordinary community problems or to gauge acceptable personal be-
havior. Constant resort to the courts also was the device for testing what 
was useful about the English legal heritage in an American setting.7 
Dispute and Conflict Resolution in Plymouth County, Massachusetts, 1725-
1825, grew out of William E. Nelson's earlier investigation of how common 
7. This summary derives from my earlier review ofKonig's book. See Billings, Book Re-
view, 53 NEW ENG. Q. 264 (1980). 
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law was Americanized.8 Like Professor Konig, Mr. Nelson in this slim little 
book concentrates his attentions upon a single geographic region in the Bay 
Colony. Where Konig treated a community in the throes of being and be-
coming, Nelson deals with one that had existed for a hundred years, and he 
is curious about how its inhabitants handled disputes and conflict during its 
second century. Early on, he concludes the impossibility of ascertaining 
"how disputatious eighteenth-century New England was," and so, he deter-
mines to "focus upon the techniques by which disputes were resolved rather 
than upon the frequency at which they arose." To obtain these objects he 
finds it necesary to construct two "typologies" which he contends were used 
in Plymouth County's several towns. Some towns, he argues, settled their 
disputes ''without recourse to outside institutions such as courts," while 
others "frequently did turn to the courts" (p. 4). 
Nelson identifies three principal agencies of conflict resolution: the 
town meeting, the courts, and the church congregation. Town meetings 
worked primarily as instruments of governance. The inhabitants turned to 
them only in case of "group conflict," and Nelson concludes that "the town 
meeting was not a prominent institution for adjudicating disputes" (p. 22). 
The courts were more likely to control what is called "the dispute resolution 
process." Their main purpose ''was dispute resolution, even though the 
Court of Sessions, in particular, did possess some broader governmental 
jurisdiction" (p. 26). While the third agency, the church congregation, 
worked in a fashion similar to the courts, it was distinguished from them by 
the greater frequency of its meetings and its informality, as well as by the 
different sanctions it employed and its judging of moral rather than crimi-
nal misdeeds. 
Having described the devices for settling disputes, Nelson next com-
pares what conditions in the fourteen towns, of which Plymouth County 
consisted, led their residents to tum to "their local congregation for the res-
olution of their disputes with the circumstances under which they brought 
their disputes to formal legal institutions" (pp. 74-75). Most of the time the 
church, at least down to the onset of the Revolution, appears to have been 
the preferred agency. But certain conditions, such as the recalcitrance of 
suitors who refused to submit to church discipline, the presence of dissent-
ers or schismatics, and what are denominated "commercial litigants" dic-
tated recourse to the courts. 
The Revolution worked great changes in these patterns. Both during 
and after the conflict for independence, citizens of all the towns turned 
more fractious, and the informal agencies declined in their effectiveness as 
more suitors sought relief through the courts. There were several reasons 
for this change in Nelson's estimation. There were more suits involving 
commercial litigants, suggesting that the intrusion of more worldly men 
into the affairs of Plymouth County eroded the bonds of religious cohesion. 
Then too, Nelson finds an increase in the number of dissenters living in the 
county, and clearly, these people had little inclination to tum for help to the 
Congregationalists. There was also the effect of the rise of party politics in 
the 1790's, which became institutionalized early in the new century. By 
8. W. NELSON, THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL 
CHANGE ON MAsSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975). 
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1810, therefore, these intrusions into a formerly stable community bonded 
by common agreement in religion and social mores led to the emergence of 
groups who saw the courts, not the church and town meetings, as the vital 
forum for adjudicating disputes. In short, that change signalled the dissolu-
tion of the social contract which held the county together since its 
beginnings. 
A.G. Roeber paints on a much grander canvas than those of Konig and 
Nelson. His subject in Faithful Magistrates and Republican Lawyers is the 
place of lawyers in what he terms "Virginia legal culture" throughout the 
century and a quarter following 1680. In portraying that object, he endeav-
ors to challenge Charles S. Sydnor's conclusions about the impact of the 
Revolution on the Old Dominion's law and political institutions. 
Some thirty years ago, Sydnor wrote the classic exposition of Virginia 
politics in the age of George Washington. Lawyers did not occupy a promi-
nent place in the Sydnor formulation. Although some in the Virginia dy-
nasty trained in the law, he maintained "planters, not lawyers, dominated 
politics." Those planters controlled that first stepping stone to political pre-
ferment, the county courts, and that monopoly insured their dominance, as 
well as the initiation of those whom they chose for advancement. They 
helped make a revolution, but the struggle to cut the English ties left them 
pretty much as they had entered it, at the head of society.9 
Roeber regards this as a superficial assessment of the situation, and so 
he sets about constructing an alternate interpretation. A necessary ingredi-
ent to his purposes is what he discerns as the professionalization of the col-
ony's law and the modernization of its society (p. xvi). Throughout the 
eighteenth century, the law's complexity grew, the number of lawyers pro-
liferated, and something he calls "print culture" spread across a "nonliter-
ate plantation society." Before 1750, however, no colonist talked of modern 
society, of law as science, or of lawyering as a professional calling. Instead, 
Virginians "interpreted events according to their identification with one of 
two opposing traditions-'Court' and 'Country' " (p. xvii). 
By these lights, most Virginians were Countrymen. That is to say, down 
to mid-century, they conceived law to be of a highly local and personal 
nature. Lawyers they distrusted for being lawyers, but more so because 
trained barristers were Courtmen who viewed themselves as a group with a 
collective interest in centralizing power in the capital. The colonists had 
long existed without lawyerly pettifoggery; indeed, early on few trained 
lawyers went to the Old Dominion because of the slender pickings there. 
Every county had its bench comprised of members drawn from the leading 
planter families, and at their regular sessions, these judges dispensed a jus-
tice rooted deeply in the demands of deference and dependence which de-
fined English and Virginia Country ways. These sessions were important 
beyond their judicial purpose; they were encrusted with rituals whose per-
formance served as a reminder of every man's place in the rural social or-
der. In fact, Roeber maintains the proposition that these rituals, thickly 
described, reveal the extent to which Virginians adhered to Country ideals. 
Although temperamentally hostile to Courtmen, Virginians came 
9. C. SYDNOR, GENTLEMEN FREEHOLDERS: POLITICAL PRACTICES IN WASHINGTON'S 
VIRGINIA (1952). 
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grudgingly to accept them. A reason for their acceptance, Roeber informs 
his reader, was tied to the development of towns and commerce. These 
indices of modernity engendered litigation that transcended county bound-
aries as it revealed the incompetence of local magistrates to manage more 
complicated legal issues than those they ordinarily confronted. Moreover, 
as the eighteenth century unfolded, there was a greater need for the law's 
revision and standardization, as well as for formally trained men to admin-
ister a growing corpus of law. As statutes increased in quantity and com-
plexity, the professional bar, committed to the centralizing tendencies in 
Court philosophy, emerged. Its members began to subvert the oral culture 
of Country society, and on the eve of the breach with England, the lawyers 
had elbowed themselves to places of leadership. 
Lawyers not only revolutionized the legal order, but they helped lead 
the Old Dominion through the Revolution. They did so by persuading 
their Country cousins that Courtmen could be as good republicans as they. 
All the while, the professionals continually eroded the power of the local 
magistracy until their triumph came in the complete overhaul of the com-
monwealth's entire court structure. In the end, then, Virginia's legal culture 
was "created by both faithful magistrates and republican lawyers" (p. 261 ). 
Law and Society in Puritan Massachusetts is the most compelling of 
these volumes. Its success is due to Konig's judicious development of its 
major themes, a result of evidence carefully considered and cogently em-
ployed. Konig draws freely from, among other things, those contemporary 
English treatises and manuals that influenced the saints' attempts to tailor 
the home country's legal customs to new uses. The arguments are usually 
persuasive because their author writes with flair. He owns a keen eye for 
the apt quotation, just as he has an ear for the neatly-turned phrase. What 
mars though is the occasional lapse into social-science-speak, which clouds . 
rather than illuminates the exposition. On balance, the book stands as a 
fine illustration of work that takes the examination of colonial law beyond 
traditional boundaries toward considering the law's wider implications for 
the transfer of British culture to the New World. It is, in short, the sort of 
study Willard Hurst has called for. 
Analyzing the connection between law and dispute resolution is a wor-
thy enterprise, but Nelson's treatment is unsatisfactory. Too often Nelson 
exhibits excessive concern for the statistical purity of his evidence, creating 
thereby the perhaps unwarranted imp1ession that means count for more 
than results. What results are produced frequently state the obvious, inflate 
conclusions, or obscure the significant. Is it edifying to learn that in the 
1790s most Plymouth men still farmed? Is it in the least surprising to dis-
cover that Quakers were more likely to take their troubles with the saints to 
court instead of to church? And, is every disagreement over hiring or main-
taining a Congregational minister necessarily a sign of religious disputa-
tion? Plainly, some of this difficulty derives from Nelson's resort to 
statistical methodology. Its employment automatically has a limiting effect 
upon prose style. There are just so many ways by which tabular evidence 
may be rendered into words. -
Even allowing generously for such limitations, Nelson's writing is very 
nearly impenetrable at times, and comprehending the book requires strict 
concentration. That done, comparing it with Konig's leaves a reader to 
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wonder if the two works do not come to opposite conclusions about the 
place and role oflegal institutions in Bay communities. Konig downgrades 
the significance of the town meeting and the church congregation, just as he 
sees in rising numbers of court cases a sign of Essex's vitality and stability. 
Nelson regards the town meeting and the congregation, especially the latter, 
as important agencies for settling conflicts. He interprets the greater re-
course to the courts in the period after the Revolution as a sign of the 
breakdown of an old social consensus. His stand seems closer to that of 
earlier Puritan students. This contradiction, if such it be, cannot be recon-
ciled without further inquiry. 
Faitlful Magistrates and Republican Lawyers piquc;:s one's interest be-
cause of its subject matter, but reading it soon dulls that curiosity. The 
book is misconceived in ways that severely flaw it. Revising Charles Syd-
nor's work is a plausible enough undertaking. Classic though it is, it is not 
the last word on eighteenth-century Virginia. But Sydnor was quite uncon-
cerned with the place of lawyers in the Old Dominion's golden age. He 
dismissed them as unimportant. Hence, he is more Roeber's straw-man 
than his foil. 
Roeber also tries to fit his facts into a curious view of colonial politics 
and society. They will not go into the mold because the viewpoint is wrong. 
He insists on tying the professionalization of lawyers to what he perceives 
as a wider contest between English imperial authorities and growing num-
bers of colonial republicans. In itself, the rise of the Virginia bar is a sig-
nificant, though by no means new, concern of legal historians. Actually, it 
is the topic of Alan McKinley Smith's 1967 dissertation and E. Lee Shep-
ard's recent article, both of which have more to offer on the subject than 
Roeber presents. 10 In Roeber's hands, the Court-Country model distorts 
· events and evidence to the extent that it loses whatever usefulness it might 
have. The technique of "thick description" as a device to illuminate the 
attachments of lawyers and magistrates to the ideals of Court and Country 
obfuscates rather than clarifies. How details relate to actions or changed 
circumstances is seldom revealed. Phrases like "legal culture," "print cul-
ture" or "non-literate plantation society" lack precise definition, causing the 
reader to ponder their meaning as well as their import. At the last, he is 
never sure whether Roeber is doing legal history, social history, or a little of 
both. 
In conclusion, these books invite comment on the condition of the legal 
history revival. Apparently, few scholars have heeded Flaherty's plea for a 
more intensive investigation of the colonial South. Massachusetts Bay still 
garners a disproportionate share of attention. If that imbalance does not 
abate, we may be verging on that dreadful day when we know more about 
the Bay Colony than we need or ought to know. Another result is evident 
in the Roeber volume. It is a pioneer study that is clearly impaired by its 
author's misapprehensions of Virginia's legal and political arrangements. 
10. Alan M. Smith, Virginia Lawyers, 1680-1776: The Birllt of an American Profession 
(1967) (unpublished manuscript available through Johns Hopkins University or University 
Microfilms International); Shepard, Lawyers Look at Themselves: Professional Consciousness 
and the Virginia Bar, 1770-1850, 25 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1981). 
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Had there been a fund of basic research on the courts, their officers, and the 
laws themselves, Roeber might well have avoided many of those mistakes. 
All three are part of the series Studies in Legal History published under 
the auspices of the American Society for Legal History. Since its inception, 
it has achieved distinction as an important outlet for new work. Such 
prominence merits recognition, as well as continued support, for the Soci-
ety, just as it places special responsibilities upon the series editors. They 
must exercise rigorous care in considering and preparing manuscripts for 
print. 
Sad to report, such attention to these volumes is not always evident. 
Nelson's and Roeber's are especially marred by sloppy preparation. Typo-
graphical and spelling errors, as well as infelicitous phrasing and imprecise 
usage afflict both. If the authors failed to catch these, then the editors 
should have. After all, the process of publication is a cooperative venture, 
the purpose of which is to produce books that express the author's findings 
clearly, concisely, compellingly. These three books do not always meet the 
standard, and to the degree they do not their worth is diminished. 
The purpose for commenting upon these editorial slips is to make this 
point in the words of Ben Johnson: "Neither can his mind thought to be in 
Tune, whose words do jarre, nor his reason in frame, whose sentence is 
preposterous; . . . How shall we look for wit from him whose leasure and 
head, assisted with the examination of his eyes, yield you no life or sharp-
ness in his writing?" 11 Each ofus who does legal history should keep sight 
of our unique dependence upon the written word. If we write poorly, we 
shall be condemned to obscurity. 
Before the social historians' techniques and assumptions work their way 
too deeply into the legal scholar's thinking, it is well worth a hard look at 
the implications of such a commitment. Two of these, one technical, the 
other philosophical, possess the greatest moment for the new legal history. 
The utility of quantitative methods is not in doubt; some of its results 
are. Quantification is too often employed to measure the obvious, and the 
product it achieves necessarily seems banal. Its disciples frequently labor 
under the misguided conviction that the very use of quantifiable evidence 
somehow invests findings with superior authority. Colonial court records 
seldom were kept in a fashion that allows reconstruction of what they recall 
with mathematical precision. At best, no matter the technique, all the 
records reveal an approximation of reality, which is all any mode of histori-
cal investigation is capable of achieving. 12 
By the same token, legal scholars should approach social history's theo-
ries with an open skepticism. 13 How valuable is Roeber's use of an anthro-
pological concept like ''thick description," for example? Describing 
cultures is very much a part of what anthropologists do, but description 
performs a much less prominent role for legal historians, who are about the 
business of interpreting the significance of their evidence as it relates to 
11. 5 The Underground Grammarian, 1 (1981). 
12. See Jones, From Historical Sociology to Theoretical History, 27 BRIT. J. Soc. 295, 302-
03 (1976). 
13. See id at 300-04 (criticizing the "eclectic manner in which historians have "shopped 
around" in sociology for usable concepts). 
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change over time. If they are content merely to describe every fact they 
find, they have interpreted nothing. Anthropological description and histor-
ical interpretation are different species of intellectual enterprise. The latter 
implies a willingness to discriminate among bits and pieces of evidence and 
to decide that some are more significant than others, just as it means ar-
raying the chosen facts in a fashion that gives them meaning. And what of 
an idea like modernization, which has gained.such extraordinary popularity 
lately? Created by social scientists as a theoretical device to describe the 
emergence of developing nations in the modem era, colonialists have found 
it a most seductive theory. It is, in the words of one enthusiast, "far more 
critical to an understanding of the first two centuries of American life and 
far more worthy of scholarly attention than the American Revolution." 14 
D.H. Murdock terms such expressions of enthusiasm "regrettable," observ-
ing that modernization posits a crudely linear historical development. It 
also imposes artificial categories on the growth of social entities, as it 
"leaves no room for the discontinuities, divergent developments and persis-
tent survivals of the obsolete which characterize the history of most 
societies." 15 
Raising such criticism does not automatically brand the critic a Luddite. 
The reason for calling attention to them is not to condemn social history, let 
alone to argue that it holds no relevance for the legal historian. Quite 
clearly, it does. In the hands of a sensitive, skillful, and imaginative scholar 
like David Konig, its approaches yield impressive results. The point of the 
objection is that social history is no sovereign cure for the problems of a 
newly emergent legal history; it has its limitations. 16 And so, before rush-
ing to quantification and social scientific theory willy-nilly, legal historians 
should heed the advice of that ancient precept, caveat emptor. 
14. Greene, The Social Origins of the American Revolution: An Evaluation and an Interpre-
tation, 88 PoL. Sc1. Q. I, 21 (1973). 
15. Murdock, Book Review, 23 HIST. J. 949, 965-66 (1980). 
16. See Himmelfarb, Book Review, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1982, § 7 (Book Review), at 9, 
col. 2 (late city ed.). 
